BBC Radio Podcasts from The Grenfell Tower Inquiry Podcast
203 The End of the Hearings
“All the deaths were avoidable”
202 Nick Hurd
"I can’t undo the past, but I wanted to be a part of making things better”
201 Expert toxicology evidence, and closing statements on the aftermath
“They were failed before the fire, during the fire, and after the fire"
200 Closing Statements on testing and regulation
“Crime, compound negligence and neglect across this industry”
199 Expert Witnesses: Week 2
“Foolish, irresponsible and a missed opportunity”
198 Expert Witnesses
“Most shocking experiments I have ever witnessed"
197 Aftermath of the fire: Central government and the Mayor of London
“Chaos and hyperactivity in the department”
196 Aftermath of the fire: Central government and London Local Authorities
“More complex than 7/7”
195 Aftermath of the fire: The Rest Centres
“2017 was a watershed year for emergencies in the UK”
194 Aftermath of the fire: The Council: Week 2
“Caught in the eye of a terrible storm”
193 Aftermath of the fire: The Council and BSRs
“Bigger than any authority could manage”
192 Aftermath of the fire
“The system isn’t broken; it was built this way”
191 The Ministers: Week 2
“I don’t find it surprising; I find it astounding”
190 Brian Martin and the Ministers
“People looked for loopholes rather than a good solution”
189 Brian Martin
“It wasn’t a deliberate decision…simply didn’t think of it”
188 The Housing Ministry: Week 2
“A complete failure throughout the proceeding decades"
187 The Housing Ministry
“Anger, frustration and exhaustion”
186 Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government
“Appalling, delayed, partial and looks chaotic”
185 Building Research Establishment & the Government
“What you didn’t do…was spell out that people will die”
184 Building Research Establishment
‘a buck-passing load of incompetents’
183 BRE, CWCT and UKAS
"This was a fundamentally incomplete investigation"
182 National House Building Council
“This act of collaboration was, in one sense, corrupting”
181 Modules 5 & 6 Closing Statements: Firefighting
“Incompetent and incapable... to respond to a fire that was extreme but foreseeable”
180 National House Building Council and LABC
‘Does the panel feel that potentially we are sitting on a time bomb?'
179 Module 6 Opening Statements and LABC
“One of the major scandals of our time”
178 London Fire Brigade: Week 7
“It was the most appalling example of institutional failure in recent British history”
177 London Fire Brigade: Dany Cotton
“Firefighters were not necessarily prepared”
176 London Fire Brigade: Week 6
“I feel slightly embarrassed because… the advice is not clear”
175 London Fire Brigade: Week 5
“My review is pretty scathing!”
174 London Fire Brigade: Week 4
No formal guidance on when and how to end ‘stay put’
173 Module 3 Closing Statements and Module 6 Opening Statements
“The Grenfell Tower Fire was a human rights disaster”
172 - Expert Witnesses
‘Incompetence at all levels’
171 Kent Fire and Rescue Service
An alternative to “stay put”
170 London Fire Brigade: Week 3
‘This could be the proverbial cat out of the bag’
169 The London Fire Brigade
The “uncontrolled spread of fire… is a significant threat”
168 London Fire Brigade Opening Statements
“The LFB did know. They knew, and lives could and should have been saved”.
167 Closing Statements
“Truly a case of donkeys led by donkeys”
166 Expert Witness: Barbara Lane
“Professionally reckless behaviour”.
165 Expert Witnesses and the TMO
“An unnecessary tragedy”
164 Lifts
Expert witness Roger Howkins.
163 Gas Pipes and Lifts
“That culture possibly needs to change”.
162 The Smoke Ventilation Designers and Contractors
“It was impossible to install any system.. that complied with any current.. regulation.”
161 Smoke Ventilation: Building Control
“Another story of incompetence and indifference”
160 TMO’s Senior Management
“An exercise in concealment and half-truth”.
159 TMO and the London Fire Brigade
“He may not be competent for his role”.
158 The Fourth Anniversary
Today marks four years since the fire at Grenfell Tower
157 The Tenant Management Organisation
“It was clearly a major oversight. I can’t give you any other explanation, I’m sorry.”
156 Carl Stokes: Week 2
“I believe that I undertook the risk assessments to the best of my ability”.
155 Carl Stokes
“Is that not a very incurious approach for a fire risk assessor?”
154 RBKC Councillors
“I think we lacked a little humanity”.
153 Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea
“Getting out of this building by the stairs is extremely difficult”.
152 The Tenant Management Organisation: Week 2
‘Stay put’ relied on despite evacuations after fires in other TMO properties
151 The Tenant Management Organisation
‘Let’s hope our luck holds out and there are no fires in the meantime’.
150 Residents of Grenfell Tower
‘They didn’t treat us with respect or humanity or empathy’.
149 Race and Class at Grenfell
Relatives explain why they want the inquiry to consider the role played by race and class
148 Module 3 Opening Statements
Grenfell Tower ‘a landmark act of discrimination against disabled and vulnerable people’.
147 Kingspan and the BBA
‘Would it be fair… to say that you were set up by others…as Kingspan’s useful idiot’?
146 The British Board of Agrement
A ‘very basic failure of due diligence’.
145 Arconic, BBA, Siderise and Panel Systems
Arconic was warned of the risk of a cladding fire that could kill "60 to 70" people.
144 The Building Research Establishment: Week 2
A manager at the BRE accepted he made a fundamental omission when analysing test data.
143 The Building Research Establishment
A manager at the BRE denied deliberately concealing test evidence.
142 Arconic: Week 2
The cladding manufacturer admitted it had been ‘deliberately and dishonestly misleading’.
141 Arconic
Witnesses from Arconic, the cladding manufacturer, started their evidence.
140 A Pause in Proceedings
The inquiry pauses for a few weeks because of the pandemic
139 Kingspan: Week 3
Kingspan denied a “deliberate attempt to deceive” MPs after the Grenfell fire
138 Kingspan: Week 2
They’re "getting me confused with someone who gives a damn.”
137 Kingspan and Celotex
Staff from insulation manufacturer Kingspan ‘stretched the truth’
136 Celotex
Staff from the insulation manufacturer Celotex admitted they were unethical and dishonest
135 Module 2 Opening Statements & Celotex
Cladding manufacturers accused of abusing product testing and certification processes.
134 Module 2 Opening Statements
Manufacturers are accused of deliberately setting out to mislead with marketing materials
133 Expert Witnesses & the TMO
The inquiry hears from the TMO and expert witnesses Dr Barbara Lane & Beryl Menzies
132 The Inquiry’s Phase 1 Recommendations: A Year On
The Phase 1 recommendations were published last October. What progress has been made?
131 The Tenant Management Organisation: Week 2
The Inquiry heard its second week of evidence from Kensington and Chelsea’s TMO.
130 The Tenant Management Organisation
The Inquiry heard evidence from staff at the Tenant Management Organisation.
129 The Employer’s Agent: Artelia
The company which carried out a management role on the refurbishment gave evidence.
128 Building Control, Osborne Berry and SD Plastering
The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea’s Building Control gave evidence.
127 Harley, CEP, John Rowan and Partners and Max Fordham
Four companies involved in the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower gave evidence.
126 Harley Facades: Week Two
Cladding specialists Harley Facades gave its second week of evidence.
125 The Cladding Specialists: Harley Facades
The Managing Director of Harley Facades gave evidence.
124 The Contractor Rydon: Week 2
How Rydon employed a “chancer”
123 The Contractor: Rydon
Staff from the contractor Rydon gave a full week of evidence
122 Exova, Studio E and Rydon
Staff from Exova, Studio E and Rydon gave evidence
121 The Fire Consultants Exova: Week 2
The fire consultants Exova gave their second week of evidence
120 Living with Combustible Cladding
What is it like to live through lockdown in a building covered in combustible cladding?
119 The Fire Safety Consultants: Exova
The fire safety consultants Exova begin to give their evidence
118 The Architects Studio E: Week 2
The architects Studio E gave their second week of evidence
117 The Architects: Studio E
The architects Studio E began their evidence this week
116 Self-incrimination and Building Regulations Explained
A legal discussion put the Inquiry on hold this week
115 Phase 2 Opening Statements
The opening statements of Phase 2 of the inquiry
114 Phase 2 Preview
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry Podcast returns to report from Phase 2
113 Phase 1 Report: The Incident Commanders
What the Phase One report says about the fire service’s response
112 Phase 1 Report: Flat 142
What happened to the occupants of flat 142?
111 Phase 1 Report: The Building
What happened to the building during the fire
110 Phase 1 Report: The Headlines
The report into Phase 1 of the inquiry was released today
109 Phase 1 Report: Preview
The Phase 1 report is due to be released next week
108 The Story of Flat 113
What went wrong in flat 113 at Grenfell? Katie Razzall pieces together the evidence
107 Closing Statements: Day 3
Phase 1 of the inquiry concludes
106 Closing Statements: Day 2
Calls for the stay-put advice to be abandoned
105 Closing Statements: Day 1
The London Fire Brigade acknowledges it was overwhelmed on the night of the fire
104 Bereaved, Survivors and Residents: Written statements
Gloria Trevisan made a series of calls to her mother from the top floor of Grenfell Tower
103 Expert Witness: Professor David Purser
Grenfell residents died from smoke inhalation says toxicologist
102 Expert Witness: Professor Niamh Nic Daeid
The fire at Grenfell Tower was accidental concluded a forensic scientist
101 Expert Witness: Dr Duncan Glover
The wiring in a fridge freezer most likely caused the fire at Grenfell
100 Nicholas Burton
An extended interview with Nicholas Burton who lived on the 19th floor of Grenfell Tower
99 Expert Witness: Dr Barbara Lane
Many front doors in Grenfell Tower did not meet fire safety standards
98 The Control Room Operators
The inquiry heard from three 999 Control Room Operators on duty on the night of the fire
97 Expert Witness: Dr Barbara Lane
Grenfell Tower should not have been occupied said expert witness
96 Expert Witness: Professor Luke Bisby
Stay put advice should have been scrapped, according to an expert witness
95 Expert Witness: Professor José Torero
Professor José Torero splits the Grenfell tower fire into four stages
94 The Control Room Officers
999 operators outside London help deal with the volume of calls coming from Grenfell
93 The Tenant Management Organisation
Officials from the tenant management organisation in charge of the tower give evidence.
92 The council and the Tenant Management Organisation
The inquiry hears evidence from the local council and the Tenant Management Organisation
91 The gas supply company
The inquiry hears how the gas supply to Grenfell wasn’t disconnected until 23.40
90 The Police and Ambulance Service
999 call handlers struggled to give advice to residents trapped in the tower
89 Inspector Thatcher and Commander Jerome
The two most senior police officers to attend the fire give their evidence
88 The Bereaved, Survivors and Residents
Evidence from survivors of Grenfell is over for now. Here’s what we’ve learnt.
87 Marcio Gomes’ 999 call
The inquiry hears a 999 call made by Marcio Gomes as he escaped the tower
86 Marcio Gomes
Marcio Gomes describes how he and his family got out from the 21st floor.
85 Natasha Elcock and Hanan Wahabi
Firefighters didn't reach Natasha Elcock and her family until 4.30 in the morning
84 Elizabeth Sobiesczak
Elizabeth Sobiesczak had lived in Grenfell Tower for 32 years before the fire
83 Nicholas Burton and Helen Gebremeskel
Nicholas Burton and his wife were rescued by firefighters from the 19th floor
82 Rashida Ali, Hoang Khanh Quang, and Sid Ali Atmani
Three witnesses who escaped the tower within 45 minutes of the first 999 call
81 Sener Macit and Alemishet Demissie
Sener Macit stayed in his flat on the 16th floor until after 3.30
80 Roy Smith
Roy Smith thought he and his family were going to die on the 12th floor of Grenfell Tower
79 Paulos Tekle and Rabia Yahya
Paulos Tekle, who’s five-year old son Isaac died, gave evidence
78 Naomi Li and Hamid Wahbi
Naomi Li was one of 13 residents who took shelter in a flat on the 22nd floor
77 Farhad Neda and Flora Neda
Farhad Neda and his mother Flora were the only two residents to escape from the top floor
76 Petra Doulova and Jose Vieiro
The inquiry hears how a resident escaped from the 20th floor
75 Omar Alhaj Ali and Oluwasuen Talabi
Two of the eight residents trapped in flat 113 on the 14th floor describe their ordeal
74 Rosemary Oyewole
Rosemary Oyewole’s neighbours sheltered in her flat on the 14th floor as the fire spread
73 Richard Fletcher and Mariko Toyoshima-Lewis
A father carries his six-year-old daughter out of the tower from the 16th floor
72 Sam Daniels and Branislav Lukic
Sam Daniels describes leaving his father in a smoke-filled flat on the sixteenth floor
71 Meron Mekonnen, Hiwot Dagnachew and Maher Khoudair
Survivors from Grenfell Tower make phone calls to a friend trapped on the 18th floor
70 Nadia Jafari and Munira Mahmud
Nadia Jafari was separated from her father as they tried to escape in a smoke-filled lift
69 Miguel Alves
An 18th floor resident tells the inquiry the building was like a ‘ticking time bomb’
68 Antonio Roncolato and Fatima Alves
The first two survivors to give evidence to the inquiry
67 The Firefighters
The inquiry has heard evidence from 82 firefighters, here’s what we’ve learnt
66 Group Manager O’Neill, Watch Manager Ricketts and Station Manager Davis
The final day of firefighter evidence in this part of the inquiry
65 Commissioner Cotton
The chief fire officer in London says nothing could have stopped the fire spreading
64 Assistant Commissioner Roe
A senior officer describes a delay in finding building plans as a “major deficiency”
63 Deputy Assistant Commissioner O’Loughlin and Assistant Commissioner Roe
A senior officer tells the inquiry no one should have lived in Grenfell Tower
62 Deputy Assistant Commissioner O’Loughlin
The inquiry hears from the third firefighter to take charge of the incident
61 Station Manager Walton
The Inquiry hears from the second firefighter in charge of the incident
60 Watch Managers Harrison and Coltress and Firefighter Johnson
A fire officer tells families he hopes they get the justice they deserve
59 Group Manager Welch
The Inquiry learns two firefighters were in charge of the incident at the same time
58 Assistant Operations Manager Debbie Real and Control Room Operators Angela Gotts and Aisha Jabin
A 999 call operator spends 40 minutes comforting a woman trapped on the top floor
57 Operations Manager Alexandra Norman and Control Room Operator Peter Duddy
A 999 call handler describes how he couldn’t persuade a family to leave their flat.
56 Group Manager Goulbourne, Crew Manager Morrison and Firefighter Wood
The chairman of the inquiry resists calls to make safety recommendations before January
55 Station Manager Wolfenden, Watch Managers Furnell and Leaver, Firefighters Bell and Juggins
A miscommunication means firefighters don’t act on 999 information for an hour
54 Crew Managers Codd, Gallagher and Hoare, and firefighters Fernandes, Foster, Lawson and Orchard
Two firefighters tell nine residents to stay inside their flats as the fire spreads
53 Firefighters Cornelius, Herrera , Merrion, Murphy, Upton, Wharnsby, and Crew Manager McAlonen
Firefighters give their account of what happened on the 14th floor
52 Watch Manager Johnson and Station Manager Loft
A lack of ‘vital’ building plans hampers rescues
51 Station Managers Kipling and Myatt, Watch Managers Johnson and Moore and Firefighters King and Moore
Firefighters struggle with low water pressure, falling debris and a lack of training
50 Group Manager Goodall and Station Manager Myatt
Firefighters are overwhelmed by the volume of 999 calls
49 Ambrose Mendy
A man who lost two relatives in the fire visits Grenfell
48 The Story So Far
What we’ve learnt over the past nine weeks
47 Crew Manager Batcheldor, 999 Control Operator Sharon Darby and Watch Manager Beale
A firefighter comforts a mother and her son trapped on the fourteenth floor
46 Station Manager Mulholland and 999 Control Operator Darby
A senior firefighter tells the inquiry adhering to policy was a challenge
45 Watch Managers Williams and Aston-O’Donovan, and firefighter Desforges
Two firefighters help carry out nine rescues on three different floors
44 Watch Manager Williams
A firefighter struggles to keep track of who has been rescued from the tower
43 Crew Manager Diana
In a special edition Eddie Mair speaks to Aldo Diana who rescued nine people
42 Watch Managers de Silvo and Peckham
A firefighter writes details of those trapped in the tower on the wall of the third floor
41 Watch Manager Sadler and Watch Manager de Silvo
Two firefighters vital to passing on information about trapped residents give evidence
40 Watch Manager Watson and Station Manager Cook
A man carrying an axe and claiming to be an American firefighter is turned away
39 Firefighters O’Donoghue, Gillam and Roberts
Firefighters describe their attempt to extinguish the fire from the roof
38 Firefighters Hippel and Bettinson, and Crew Manager Stern
Two firefighters describe their attempt to rescue a man on the 16th floor
37 Emergency Control Operators and Firefighter Keane
A 999 operator stays on the phone with a trapped 12-year old girl for an hour
36 Deputy Assistant Commissioner Fenton
The highest ranked officer in the 999 control room gives evidence
35 Station Manager Oliff
A firefighter makes the "impossible" decision to tell a man to go back and get his family
34 Operations Manager Smith: Day 2
Residents are told to evacuate the building
33 Operations Manager Smith
The first insight into the 999 control room
32 Watch Manager Meyrick
What happened to information from residents’ 999 calls?
31 Watch Manager O’Keeffe and Firefighter Dorgu
Firefighter Dorgu carries casualties out of the tower
30 Watch Manager O’Keeffe
Firefighters run out of equipment and a rescue attempt on the 14th floor
29 Crew Manager Christopher Secrett and Watch Manager Brien O’Keeffe
Crew Manager Christopher Secrett describes how he doesn’t think he will make it out alive
28 Fire Safety Officer Egan, Crew Manager Secrett and Firefighter O’Hanlon
Daniel Egan speaks to a mother trapped in the tower with her two children
27 Firefighter O’Beirne and Senior Fire Safety Officer Egan
Daniel Egan explains why residents should have been evacuated from the tower earlier
26 Firefighters O’Beirne and Abell
Firefighter Abell uses a ladder to help rescue two people trapped on the fifth floor
25 Firefighters Brown and Badillo
Firefighter Badillo’s rescue attempt on the twentieth floor
24 The First Firefighters In Flat 16
The first firefighters who tackled the fire in flat 16 give evidence
23 The first incident commander: Day 3
The first firefighter to take charge at Grenfell continues his evidence
22 The first incident commander: Day 2
The first firefighter to take charge at Grenfell continues his evidence
21 The First Incident Commander
The first firefighter to take charge at Grenfell gives his evidence
20 The residents of flat 16
Flat 16: the inquiry hears evidence from the residents of the flat where the fire started
19 Expert witnesses: Luke Bisby
How did the fire spread from where it started in flat 16?
18 Expert witnesses: Niamh Nic Daeid
How and where the fire started
17 Expert witnesses: Barbara Lane
The failure of fire safety measures at Grenfell Tower.
16 Opening statements: Day 4
Lawyers for the fire brigade make their case
15 Opening statements: Day 3
Lawyers for the tenant in whose flat the fire started and the council make their cases
14 Opening statements: Day 2
Lawyers for survivors, bereaved and residents set out their stall
13 Opening statements: Day 1
The counsel for the inquiry sets out its stall
12 Commemoration: Day 7
The final day of memorials to those who died
11 Commemoration: Day 6
The inquiry hears memorials to those who died
10 Commemoration: Day 5
The inquiry hears memorials to those who died
9 Commemoration: Day 4
The inquiry hears memorials to those who died
8 Commemoration: Day 3
The inquiry hears memorials to those who died
7 Commemoration: Day 2
The inquiry continues to hear memorials to those who died
6 Commemoration: Day 1
The inquiry opens and begins to hear memorials to those who died
5 Hopes and expectations
What do families and campaigners want the Grenfell Tower Inquiry to achieve?
4 The Chair
What do we know about the chair of the Grenfell inquiry, Sir Martin Moore-Bick?
3 Eleven Months On
Cataloguing what's happened between the Grenfell fire and the start of the public inquiry
2 Holborn Bars
A guide to the inquiry rooms and advice from a former chair of a public inquiry
1 Welcome to the The Grenfell Tower Inquiry
A daily podcast from the public inquiry into the fire at Grenfell Tower in June 2017.